Technology policy in the process of change: changing paradigms in research and technology policy? by Schienstock, Gerd
TECHNOLOGY POLICY IN
THE PROCESS OF CHANGE:
CHANGING PARADIGMS IN
RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGY
POLICY?
Gerd Schienstock
Cuadernos de Sección. Ciencias Sociales y Económicas 2. (1995) p. 99-125
ISBN: 84-87471-90-0
Donostia: Eusko lkaskuntza
Technology Policy is the main practical aspect in CTS studies. Genera//y, states are an important part in the
assesment and developing technologies. But traditional values have collapsed, because of serious problems in the
implementation, control and distribution of technological development. So that, the actual situation requires new para-
digms in orden to rearrange state fuctions in this issue. New practices and institutions have appeared a/ready, which are
reflecting a new attitude towards the relationships between technology and state.
La política tecnológica es el principal aspecto práctico de lOS estudios CTS. Usualmente, lOS estados son una
importante parte de la evaluación y desarrollo tecnológicos. Pero lOS valores tradicionales han colapsado a causa de
graves problemas en la implementación, control y extensión del desarrollo tecnológico. Por ello, la actual situación
requiere nuevos paradigmas a fin de reorganizar las funciones del estado en esta materia. Han aparecido ya nuevas
prácticas e instituciones que reflejan una nueva actitud hacia las relaciones del estado con la tecnología.
CTS ikerketen alderdi praktiko nagusia politika tekonologikoa da. Estatuak, normalean, ebaluaketa eta gara-
pen teknologikoaren alderdi garrantzitsua izan ohi dira. Balio tradizionalak, ordea kolapsatu egin dira garapen teknolo-
gikoaren ezarrera, kontrola eta hedapena direla eta. Horregatik, oraingo egoerak paradigma berriak eskatzen ditu gai
honetan estatuak dituen funtzioak berrantolatzearren. Dagoeneko, praktika eta instituzio berriak agertu dira, eta horiek
estatuak teknologiarekiko harremanetan duen jarrera berria islatzen dute.
1. INTRODUCTION
There is no modern industrialised country not pursuing research and technology
pol icy1 in one way or another. Although state interventionism in general is viewed more
and more sceptically and despite an increasing shift towards favouring the regulating
power of the market, hardly any call has been voiced thus far for the state’s withdrawal
from the fields of research, innovation and technology. To the contrary: not only is public
R & T policy considered to be as indispensable as ever for stimulating economic growth,
but it has acquired an even growing importance within the scale of state activities. It may
be expected that, as knowledge about the complexity of technological innovation in-
creases, state R & T policy will gradually develop into an independent policy field (see
Edquist, this volume).
Rather than asking for an expansion of technology policy along existing lines, cri-
tics refer to the lack of attention devoted to the social shaping of technological develop-
ment, as well as to the social compatibility of technological change. Moreover, it is point-
ed out that there is a lack of ecological precautions and environmentally - benign tech-
nology - a deficit whose solution is also expected from the state. What one has in mind,
though, is not an expansion of R & T policy by complementary measures which take into
account social and ecological aspects. Rather, there is a generalized call for either an
integrative or systemic technology policy. According to OECD, there is a need for com-
plete re-orientation within this policy field. Its substance must be newly defined, new
spheres of intervention must be identified and new structural arrangements must be
developed (OECD 1988). In the following, some of the tendencies shall be pointed out of
such a re-orientation in state R & T policy.
2. TRADITIONAL MOTIVES FOR PUBLIC R & T POLICY
Discussions on the justification of state R & T policy are generally based on the
assumption that economic growth is the central indicator of social well-being - and as
such, constitutes a high-ranking societal goal. In turn, decisive growth impulses are said
to emanate from technological innovation. Disruptions in the course of technological
1. In the following, the abbreviation R & T policy shall be used
103
GERD SCHIENSTOCK
development - are typically depicted as a linear phase scheme; while here, for reasons
of simplification, the three stages of research, innovation and diffusion shall be distin-
guished. Because such disruptions constitute a danger to economic growth, there is
therefore a major societal interest in overcoming them (see Braun, this volume).
There is a reason for attributing such an important role in the process of techno-
logical innovation to the state: the structural problems arising within the various stages
are often not solved with equal efficiency by the market. The market process, oriented
along the self-interests of private actors as far as the goal of economic growth is concern-
ed, leads to an insufficient level and/or to an inappropriate structure of national economic
innovation. The central task of state R & T policy is considered to be to correct or even to
avoid any such deficiencies by influencing innovation. Moreover, the latter should basi-
cally continue to follow market economic principles (Littmann 1975:45). Thus, in justifying
state R & T policy crucial importance is attached to the aspect of market failure in achie-
ving economic growth - regardless of how great this failure is considered to be.
The following enumeration includes the major structural problems of the process
of technological innovation: According to the theory of economics these are solved unsa-
tisfactorily, if at all, by market-oriented economies: the availability of sufficient knowledge
in the natural sciences, the technical or economic indivisibility of large-scale projects,
and the lack of transparency of the market (Ewers/Wein 1989). As a consequence, the
state is assigned a central role in coping with these problems.
Originally, the justification of state intervention in the process of technological
innovation was primarily based on two central arguments. It is generally acknowledged
that, at the enterprise level, research is connected with considerable external effects,
Especially in the case of fundamental research in the natural sciences, third parties may
use new findings without any market transaction having taken place. As in the case of
fundamental research, the market economic principle of elimination fails: there is no
incentive for enterprises, according to wide theoretical agreement, to invest more heavily
in terms of resources in this field (Arrow 1962). This argument is less valid for applied
research: in principle, patent protection - as well as the chance to lead in know-how in
the long run - provide sufficient incentives for investment by private industry.
Subsequently, as far as research is concerned, market economic regulation,
provides an unsatisfactory allocation of resources for attaining the goal of economic
growth. This shortcoming is used to justify the fact that, above all fundamental research
is not controlled by the market but rather by the state - i.e. that it is either carried out by
state institutions or at least supported by these, with results accessible to all market par-
ticipants (Ewers 1990: 150).
This is all the more true if technological progress is claimed to be based on the
“osmosis model” (Hetzler 1970). This serves as the second argument for state R & T
policy. This model implies that the extent of fundamental research substantially influen-
ces the opportunities for technological innovation - which, in turn, determines the growth
rate of the social product. In the case of an inadequate level of fundamental scientific
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research, the redistribution of resources towards this stage of technological progress
makes it possible to initiate a process of national economic growth.
Although there is no doubt that an increase in scientific knowledge raises a
society’s innovative potential, its utilisation is by no means automatically guaranteed. This
is why, in connection with the support of fundamental research, the concept of “condi-
tions providing policy” is used to distinguish it from R & T policy as such (see Boxsel, this
volume). Transforming new scientific findings into technological innovation, is basically a
matter of those decisions taken by business on how to utilise them. Actions taken at the
enterprise level, however, quite often prove detrimental to national economic growth.
Therefore, it seems obvious to put the emphasis of state R & T policy on guaranteeing the
transfer of technological knowledge, rather than on encouraging and supporting funda-
mental research. Such a strategy proves rational, especially for small national economies
unable to provide the enormous financial means necessary for carrying out fundamental
research. Even in Japan, the transfer of modern technology from the leading industrialis-
ed nations was originally promoted by the state primarily to initiate a process of econo-
mic recovery. Only recently, after Japan’s establishment as a leading industrialised
nation, has the promotion of fundamental research gained in importance within state R &
T policy (see Kawasaki, this volume).
In the case of large-scale technologies, the transformation of scientific findings
is also becoming a problem hardly manageable by the market alone. The massive finan-
cial requirements resulting from their technological and/or economic indivisibility, quite
often exceed the capacities of private companies. In such fields as transport technology,
space technology, nuclear energy and computer technology, the governments of most of
the large industrialised nations subsequently feel compelled to extend their engagements
in technological innovation to fields of applied research. These fields are closer to the
market and thus avoid the risk of innovative activities being curtailed due to the financing
problems of private industry. However, the following must be admitted as well: in view of
the enormous research and development budgets of multinational corporations, the fai-
lure of the market in terms of technological and/or economic indivisibility can be used
only to a limited extent to legitimatise state research and technology policy (Ewers
1990:151).
The additional danger of fundamental scientific knowledge being transformed
into technological innovation, only exists if there is a lack of information on the probabi-
lity of success of these innovations. This problem is gaining more and more importance:
the profitability of investment in high-tech research and development, is hard to estimate
due to the long “running-in” periods involved. Although public subsidies may not reduce
the risk of failure, they may well reduce related costs. It is argued that, if companies’
research expenditure is reduced by state subsidies, then companies will engage more
readily in financial commitments difficult to calculate in advance (see Braun, this volume).
Public support in these cases, however, is by no means an uncontentious issue: it implies
that public institutions are indeed more capable than industrial enterprises to estimate
future market risks and, accordingly, that the companies’ risk precautions are not justi-
fied in case of an appropriate transparency of the market. Reality has proved otherwise:
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public institutions’ estimations of financial risks in the development and marketing of new
technologies, are quite frequently inadequate. The result of this is the permanent neces-
sity of their adopting a role as permanent donors of subventions.
As discussions have shown, a public R & T policy based on economic targets is
rather limited in its scope of legitimatisation. State intervention in the process of techno-
logical innovation, however, may not be justified by the failure of the market argument
alone. One should also consider the necessity of gaining and maintaining international
competitiveness (Rothwell and Zegveld 1980). Competitive enterprises in so-called key
technology areas are considered to be inevitable if technological dependencies detri-
mental to the national economy are to be avoided. Here, the perspective of state support
does not only refer to fundamental research but also increasingly to the stage of develop-
ment at the enterprise level.
Public technology policy in Japan is especially characterised by such an orien-
tation towards key technologies. According to McMillan, “The Japanese have learnt the
lessons of the post-industrial and information revolution and turned them to competitive
advantage” (1984:64). What is characteristic of Japanese R & T policy, is that the eco-
nomy is regarded as a bundle of sectors, branches and industries. All of these are
analysed by the state with regard to such criteria as prospects for the future, net product
or world market potential. Also, an optimal composition of the economy is aimed at by
special state R & T policy measures encouraging such promising industries as informa-
tion and data technology, new material technology, biotechnology, automatic manufac-
turing systems, etc. (see Kawasaki, this volume). In the meantime, however, a number of
other countries have also adopted an R & T policy concentrating on the support of key
technologies.
This means that national R & T policies are becoming more and more similar. All
states promote the development of  the same key technologies, without taking into
account national specificities or the characteristics of national innovation systems. At pre-
sent, a vividly-discussed topic is the fact that the semiconductor development is charac-
terised by considerable structural deficiencies in European countries - which bears the
risk of a European technological dependence on the US and Japan. This is why, again
and again, the massive subsidisation of European companies has been demanded in the
development of silicon semiconductors.
Here again, however, the legitimacy of public research and technology policy
seems to be questionable at best. For one thing, the argument of the expediency of
international division of labour may be used against it. For another, in view of the growing
globalisation tendencies of large corporations and the increasing number of strategic
alliances being formed, it has become difficult to ascertain which are those enterprises
worthy of support in terms of maintaining national competitiveness. In the case of semi-
conductor development, cooperation between a German and a US corporation at the
expense of a European one, raises doubts about the existence of national or Europe-wide
support of key technologies. As shown by Edquist, this dilemma of public technology
policy may frequently be encountered in small countries (see Edquist, this volume).
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Traditional research and technology policy, as well as its bases of legitimatisa-
tion, have been subject to criticism in various respects. First, there is considerable doubt
about the basic assumptions of the “osmosis model”. It may by no means be clearly
proved whether the support of fundamental research over various stages of the innova-
tion process, finally leads to the development of new marketable products and proces-
ses - and thus, to economic growth. The substantive growth processes which took place
in the highly-developed industrialised countries after World War II, may not even predo-
minantly be attributed to state innovation policies. It certainly seems equally justified to
name a variety of other factors as having caused them.
By the same token, there is no definite empirical evidence that international com-
petitiveness may be guaranteed by means of state policy. It is true that public research
and development subventions are provided massively in those areas where individual
industrialised nations hold a particularly strong position in international competition
(Krupp 1987). A clear-cut assignment of cause and effect, though, is hardly possible.
Also one may consider the thesis of plausible state research and development policy as
being attracted by economic success rather than as causing it. In any case, it is difficult
to prove the success of traditional innovation policy with regard to the objective of initia
ting economic growth.
However, traditional R & T policy is criticised not only because of the uncertain
prospects of success. It is also questioned because of its traditional understanding of
technology development and policy. Economic competitiveness is exclusively related to
technological  progress; thus, a substant ive concept ion of  technology prevai ls (see
Braun, this volume). According to this narrow definition, technology is understood in
terms of machines and production facilities. Accordingly, public R & T policy concen-
trates on the support of scientific findings and the development of substantive techno-
logy. However, there is much room for doubt as to whether the competitiveness of enter-
prises on the world market depends exclusively on the modernity of substantive techno-
logy. Conversely, it might be the other way around: as shown by the example of Japan,
organisation and management aspects play an equally important role. This implies that
the traditional, technologically-oriented R & T policy must accept the argument regarding
the limits of its purely technological approach towards an optimal path to economic
growth. At the same time, the question is raised again, though from another perspective,
in how far state interventionism is expected to interfere in market-oriented stages of the
technological innovation process.
3. FROM SUBSTANTIVE TECHNOLOGY TO TECHNOLOGICAL PRACTICE
In recent debates on Fordism, it has become clear that the progress in producti-
vity connected with its diffusion was not due to the mere technical innovation of the con-
veyor belt: rather, this was possible only in combination with an appropriately adapted
, work organisation and enterprise culture (Boyer 1988). Mechanisation of production,
Taylorist principles of work organisation and a bureaucratic management concept form
an entity, so to say; it is their interaction that can be considered the secret behind the
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marked stage of growth after World War II. Hence, Fordism as a new technological para-
digm was not only characterised by technological progress, but also by changes in work
organisation and enterprise culture.
This is an expression of a changed basic understanding of technology. The
substant ive technology concept is replaced by a relat ional  one (Rammert 1989).
Technology is defined as an organised system of men and machines in which scientific
findings and experience are applied in the solution of practical problems (cf. also Dufourt
1990, quoted in Abdelmaki and Kirat, this volume). In this connection, Pacey talks about
technological practices (1983:6) which, apart from a technical dimension also include
both an organisational and a cultural dimension. Technological progress is thus a pro-
cess of combined techno-organisational and socio-cultural innovation.
Immediately evident when studying the specific structure of modern information
technology, are both the significance of a technology concept extended by the element
of practice and, simultaneously, the problematic nature of traditional policy. Due to the
software element which it incorporates in addition to the hardware, this is characterised
by a significantly higher degree of “influenceability” by social factors other than traditio-
nal technology. This means, in other words, that technological progress may not be -
reduced to the development of substantive technology; rather, the way of structuring the
working process via the development of software, is an endogenous and functionally
necessary constituent in the development of technological systems (Naschold 1986:232).
Serving as the basic assumption is, on the one hand the autonomous develop-
ment of the technological paradigm in the form of hardware; and on the other, the social
paradigm in the form of software (Dosi 1982). The utilisation of scientific findings may
already have resulted in the development of concrete technologies; however, the syste-
mic combination of these hardware components with relevant software programs, can
only be considered to be in an experimental stage. The same is true, for that matter, for
the supervisory structure, the regulation of working conditions and certain aspects of
organisation culture. In any case, it cannot yet be foreseen which combination of hard-
ware and software components, work organisational norms and enterprise culture pat-
terns may finally be considered as the most promising technology line with respect to
productivity and growth development (see Badham and Naschold, this volume).
The susceptibility towards a variation of technological system configurations
becomes obvious in the case of the conception of CIM systems. There, at least two tech-
nological practices have developed. According to Bridner, there is a technocentric and
anthropocentric development line (1985); and according to Badham, a neo- and a post-
Fordist one (this volume). The two totally contrary systems - both of which differ in tech-
nological structure, machine programming and regulations of work organisation - are
above all based on different appreciations of human labour. A similar argument is used
by Kern and Schumann, who discover in their analysis of new production concepts a
management philosophy totally different from Taylorism. They are influenced by quite
specific organisational culture patterns (Kern and Schumann 1984).
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The concept of technological practice suggests that the productivity potential of
new technologies may be fully exploited only in connection with organisational and socio-
cultural innovations. Due to their systemic or paradigmatic character (Brandenburg et al.
1976, Mensch 1977) the implications of new technologies - especially if based on advan-
ced electronics - go beyond the sphere of work at the enterprise level. To allow for their
efficient application, changes in a variety of societal institutions have also become neces-
sary. According to this basic idea, new technologies represent a scientific development
so powerful that it puts into motion entire whole chains of technological and social innova-
tions (see Braun, this volume). In this connection, Nelson and Winter talk about generali-
zed natural trajectories of technology (1977, 1982).
In her concept of  “ techno-economic paradigm”,  also Perez emphasises the
importance of  the connect ion between technological  progress and societal  change
(1987). Successful techno-economic paradigms are the result of on the one hand the
interaction between new lines of development; and on the other both selective mecha-
nisms of the economy and the natural and social environment. Before a new technologi-
cal paradigm can lead to any substantial productivity rise, it is argued, a crisis of struc-
tural adaptation must be overcome. One should add that old institutions and cultural pat-
terns as well become obsolete; they correspond to the requirements of the outdated tech-
nological system. A mis-match occurs between new technologies and the old social
model of production. This mis-match must be overcome by means of institutional change
if the new technologies’ productive potential is to be fully exploited. By institutional chan-
ge, Perez refers not only to work organisation and management aspects but above all to
the educat ional  system, industr ia l  labour relat ions, societal  value concept ions, etc.
Crucial importance is attached to the reform of the system of vocational education in
connection with the change in paradigm due to the introduction of new information tech-
nologies. Their efficient use substantially depends on the degree to which employees are
in a position to enter into active dialogue with the technological systems (Loikkanen and
SeppÑIÑ, this volume).
The example of the automobile lends itself one again to demonstrating the con-
sequences of paradigmatic technological change. Apart from representing a technolo-
gical, work-organisational and - as can easily be checked with Ford - enterprise-cultural
change in paradigm, the development and acceptance of the new transport technology
has been similarly and decisively influenced by massive public investment programs, as
well as the rise in mass consumption via wage and social policies. To carry this example
further, the oil crisis has not only encouraged new engine development but has also led
to the social innovation of the “car-free weekend”. Finally, massive technological develop-
ment initiatives may be expected in connection with legal regulations for the solution of
the recycling problem.
According to what has been said so far, social, cultural and institutional aspects
of work organisation at the level of both companies and society may be similarly decisive
as technological innovation for productivity and economic growth. This seems to be taken
into account by shifting emphases within public R & T policy. While the support of fun-
damental research continues to be uncontested, the limits have been extended within
which public activities are considered to be appropriate (OECD 1988). In view of the cen-
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tral importance of technological practices and systemic technology structures for pro-
ductivity development, it is argued that effective public innovation policy must comprise
considerably more functions than the mere financial support of research and develop-
ment or the pilot application of new technologies. It must be related much more closely
to all those factors either hampering or favoring its development or use (BrÑunling
1986:264). Essentially two groups of factors may be discerned here: socio-cultural fac-
tors of work organisation at the enterprise level, on the one hand, and institutional factors
at the societal level on the other (see Badham and Naschold, this volume).
The direct or indirect subsidisation of technology development may be of less
importance for national economic growth than the elimination of barriers to innovation at
the enterprise level or the support of factors stimulating innovation. This fact has become
uncontested as a basis of legitimatising public innovation policy. Accordingly, there is
consensus in principle regarding the state’s active role in establishing both infrastructure
and social institutions supporting technological change. This is the case, for instance,
with such economic measures as guaranteeing a low interest level; eliminatingprotective
tariffs; providing efficient traffic, transport or modern communication systems. In the
same way, this extends to an economical energy supply, far-reaching technological stan-
dardisation or even the extension of research and educational systems. However, the
question of in how far the educational system - including continuing education - is to be
adapted to the requirements of technological progress, is being discussed quite contro-
versially. Even stronger reservations exist when it comes to state intervention for the pur-
pose of re-organising such social institutions as the system of industrial relations, pro-
perty rights or social security.
The central importance of social institutions for technological change, leads to
the demand not only for extending but also for centralising public research and develop
ment policy. As a consequence, there has been a demand for the systematic integration
into public policy of all those policy spheres more or less unintentionally influencing tech-
nological progress, i.e. transforming implicit into explicit policy (see Edquist, this volume).
Independently of the fact that such a policy perspective is accompanied by enormous
coordination problems (see Badham as well as Aichholzer et al., this volume), the ques-
tion also arises of how far any such dominance of technological progress - as compared
with other societal objectives - is desirable at all. The concept of national innovation sys-
tems (see Dalum, this volume), stressing the very orientation of public R & T policy
towards national institutions and cultural patterns, is getting increasingly widespread in
the literature. This suggests at the very least that the relation between technological pro-
gress and the establishment of social institutions should not be understood as a process
of unilateral adaptation - and accordingly, that there is due justification for maintaining the
independence of individual public policy fields from R & T policy. This in no way means,
however, the discontinuing of considerations for coordinating public policies.
Even more controversial than the state’s role in institutional adaptation processes
and in providing infrastructure, is its intervention in designing production and work pro-
cesses at the enterprise level. There is basic agreement, however, that the social shaping
of new technological systems is of eminent importance under the very aspect of producti-
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vity; and this consensus also extends to the market as an appropriate medium for the
implementation of social models of work organisation within a limited range (Naschold
1986:236). From this perspective, there is quite a significant scope of intervention for
state technology policy.
Objections against the state’s active role in conceiving the social model of new
technologies, primarily, relate to the low impact of supporting projects of a model nature
as a means for public R & T policy. This refers not only to the structural conservatism of
business enterprises (Child et al. 1989) but also to the problematic nature of the transfe-
rability of forms of social organisation at the enterprise level - and thus, the model nature
of publicly-subsidised projects. Secondly, the specific sensitivity to state intervention in
this field, is due to the fact that intervention into enterprises’ production and working pro-
cesses may not be seen under the mere aspect of productivity growth. Inevitably raised
are questions of social compatibility and ecological consequences. Taking into account
such problems and thus incorporating non-economic goals as determinants of public R
& T policy, means nothing more than questioning the traditional growth-oriented policy
pattern and suggesting a complete strategic and institutional re-orientation.
4. THE CRISIS OF GROWTH-ORIENTED R & T POLICY
Thus far, the government policy objective of increasing social welfare has quite
indiscriminately been equalled with growth and productivity progress. In the discussions
in this chapter so far, however, the decisive argument has been that a lasting increase in
productivity cannot be achieved by technological innovation alone: changes in enter-
prises’ technological practices and in societal institutions are also necessary. The tech-
nological innovations encouraged by state innovation policy, however, do not lead to pro-
ductivity increases only; their development, as well as their application, involve conside-
rable risks of both a social and an ecological nature. This has given rise to an increasing
scepticism towards the traditional objectives of public R & T policy (see Braun, this vo-
lume). Social damage may by far outweigh productivity growth - leading, as a result, to a
decline in social welfare.
It is important to note that social and ecological risks are the result not only of the
very nature of substantive technology as such, but also of its use under specific cir-
cumstances As has been shown quite impressively by Perrow, the ecological risks of
modern large-scale technology are primarily the result of a lack of mutual adjustment be-
tween social organisation and technological structures (1986). In addition, the hazards to
human health as a central social risk are in many cases not due to specific mechanical
properties, but rather to work organisation structures and excessive performance stan-
dards.
Due to a specific selectivity, the capacity of the market to eliminate social and
ecological risks is considered to be extremely low. Consequently, there are a number of
further examples of market failure which might possibly contribute to considerable short-
comings of production steering (Littmann 197552): external effects of production and
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consumption, neglect of social and human standards; as well as differences between pri-
vate and general economic time spans.
The external effects of production and consumption increase dramatically in
accordance with economic and technological development. Environmental damage -
such as water and air pollution, the destruction of the ozone layer, as well as the gigan-
tic growth in waste quantities - make it clear that many people’s quality of life is conside-
rably diminished by technological progress. Impairing the quality of the free goods of
water and air as a consequence of industrial production, raises serious doubts about the
positive effects of productivity increase and economic growth on the general welfare.
Scarce resources may be misdirected if environmental protection and improve-
ment are left to the market. This becomes easy to explain when considering as the entre-
preneurial goal a ratio favorable as possible between private profits and costs as. In line
with this goal, the substitution of private costs for societal ones appears to be quite ratio-
nal - at least from the entrepreneurial point of view, This applies to the emission of toxic
gases in the same way as for discharging contaminated waste water into the rivers. As
long as the wasteful use of scarce resources does not reduce profits, there is nothing -
from the entrepreneurial perspective -that speaks against the exploitation of nature. Such
an externalisation of costs may mean technological progress from the single entrepre-
neur’s point of view; while at the level of society at large, such behaviour results in re-
duced social welfare.
Speci f ic market select iv i ty becomes also obvious when consider ing human-
oriented aspects in the conception of technological practices. A decrease in operational
costs as a consequence of work intensification due to the use of new technologies, is still
considered as technological progress in the traditional sense - even if this goes hand in
hand with physical and psychological strain. This assessment, though, cannot be shared
on the societal level: there are the considerable social costs, for instance, of medical care
and human capital lying idle. Again, costs accrued on the enterprise level during the pro-
duction process are externalised and must be borne by society as a whole.
Insufficient knowledge of the future scarcity of natural resources is said to be the
reason for yet another form of market failure. Market prices, it is argued, are steering
mechanisms related to the present, indicating only current scarcities of goods rather than
signalling future developments. Hence, such a short-term perspective of the market ine-
vitably leads to inappropriate resource allocation and a misdirection of the innovation
process from the point of view of social welfare, One argument along this line, refers to
the insufficient consideration of the needs of future generations (Ewers 1990:151).
Such failure of the market is demonstrated by the way of dealing with non-re-
newable natural resources. The fact that their availability is limited, is hardly reflected in
market prices as long as the supplied quantities correspond to demand. In this way, the
necessary adjustment processes are deferred - which may lead to considerable friction
and slow-down in growth at a later stage. Only if processes of adaptation to future condi-
tions are initiated at a very early stage, can the expected social conflicts be even somew-
hat alleviated (Littmann 197.557).
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The market mechanism contributes to environmental damage, the violation of
human standards and the neglect of future situations of scarcity. This fact suggests the
need for further perspectives on public innovation control. This does not necessarily sug-
gest renouncing the objective of growth, but rather - and at the very least - a re-orienta-
tion in the policy of growth.
There is the widespread view that the development and application of the new
EDP-based technologies may solve not only economic but also ecological and social
problems. These technologies are not only labelled as clean: they are also supposed to
lead to the simultaneous optimisation of economic and social objectives. Stimulating
technological progress by supporting research in new technologies and possibly in their
pioneering application as well - is thus considered as a comprehensive form of state
intervention no longer requiring any additional orientation towards ecological and social
objectives. Rather, there should be emphasis on maintaing the basic pattern of techno-
logy support.
Daneke criticises the idea that such a conception of new technologies makes
them a kind of panacea. He argues, however, that these are not unproblematic from the
ecological point of view. In addition, they place high demands on enterprise organisation
and public infrastructure (see Daneke, this volume) while by no means leading automa-
tically to the creation of socially compatible working structures (see Badham, this vo-
lume). If the welfare-enhancing function of technological progress is not to be impaired
by any negative effects, ecological and social objectives must explicitly be made the hall-
marks of public R & T policy.
5. THE ROLE OF TECHNOLOGY POLICY: SUPPORT OR REGULATION?
At first sight, a simple idea seems to provide a sensible orientation for a type of
R & T policy aiming at economic, ecological and social objectives. Littmann describes
this basic idea as follows: “Economic-technological innovations which would not be
carried out under the conditions of a (distorted) empirical price system, being consider-
ed unprofitable from the private enterprise point of view, shall be stimulated provided that
they contribute to working towards the socio-economic optimum. On the other hand,
those types of innovation must be discriminated against which seem promising of suc-
cess merely from the financial point of view of private industry but, taking into considera-
tion social costs and profits, would result in no a gain or even in a loss of people’s eco-
nomic welfare (Littmann 197558).
This basic idea seems to suggest a dual R & T policy incorporating both support
and regulation. “The two main thrusts of technology policy are the support of technology
and the regulation of technology. The former stems mainly from the desire to strengthen
the national economy, while the latter is mainly necessary in order to reduce health and
environmental hazards caused by the use of technology” (see Braun, this volume).
Badham (in this volume) refers to the partial inadequacy of this role assignment of the two
instruments. Thus, the development of new technologies - as mentioned above - contains
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certain aspects of regulation; while, on the other hand, there are considerable difficulties
in eliminating health hazards via legal provisions regulating working procedures. It is ra-
ther the support of new technologies which might lead to more effective results in this
area.
Putting the above-mentioned idea into practice, poses considerable difficulties
as well. Above all, the point in time at which the state should intervene by either support-
ing or hampering the process of innovation, seems to be an open question. Mayntz and
Scharpf give a very good illustration of the problematic nature of such a simple recipe as
far as fundamental research is concerned. In politics, according to the authors, it is not
possible “to nurse the vegetables and pull out the weeds: the same roots feed both the
potential for increasing social welfare and for jeopardising ittt (1990:61). The knowledge
about nuclear fission, genetic engineering, or information storage as such, may not a
priori be categorised as supportive or detrimental to social welfare. Thus, the aim of wel-
fare optimisation by public R & T policy may not be achieved by supporting fundamental
research only in those selected fields in which new findings are expected to be condu-
cive to welfare, while withholding support in all those areas where new findings conjure
up ecological and social risks.
It obviously causes insurmountable problems to attempt to exclude any negative
effects of technological progress, be they of an ecological or a social nature, through
state control over fundamental research. It does, however, seem realistic to orient this
research towards finding solutions to existing problems. It is possible to find out which
type of knowledge is necessary for solving a given social or ecological problem. Of course,
this by no means guarantees that an adequate remedy to the problem will actually be
found. On the one hand, knowing which kind of scientific knowledge is required, does not
automatically guarantee success - even if massive financial means are available for the
necessary fundamental research. On the other hand, new scientific findings are not
immediately transformed into the necessary forms of technology utilisation. In spite of
these imponderabilities, it seems appropriate to assign to state policy three main tasks
(Mayntz and Scharpf 1990:63):
- generating knowledge to find technological solutions to social problems which have
not been caused by technology itself;
- generating knowledge about possible negative side effects of currently-practiced or
prospective technological solutions (see also Edquist, this volume); and
- generating knowledge for minimising such side effects and solving problems arising
from former technological practices.
What the authors have in mind here, is primarily fundamental research in the field
of ecological systemic relationships. However, their policy conception may easily be
transferred to social problems. So, for instance, fundamental research may be aimed at
finding out where technological practices do not comply with the criterion of social com-
patibility. Also, research into the adverse long-term effects of work practices can be
made the object of fundamental research, in quite the same way as investigating possi-
bilities for confining or totally eliminating such adverse effects. The authors are well
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aware, however, that the incentive structure currently existing in fundamental research, is
hardly adequate for directing scientific interest towards the investigation of ecological
cause-and-effect relationships. To the contrary, it is systematically designed to neglect
interdisciplinary research. In view of this, it can be seen as the essential task of the state
to initiate the kind of institutional change in fundamental research that is necessary for
embarking on interdisciplinary problems (Ewers 1990:159f.). In this respect, some of the
developments in the Netherlands seem to be interesting. In the course of the 1970s spe-
cial programmes and courses were established at universities and other research insti-
tutes All of this were devoted to investigating the relationships between science, tech-
nology and society (see Boxsel, this volume).
There exists a dilemma of not being able to exclude the detrimental effects of
technological advances through controlling fundamental research. Its solution is often
considered to lie in a specific model of dualistic R & T policy. There have been attempts
to reach the goals of stimulating a level of productivity growth conducive to raising social
welfare, as well as that of maintaining national competitiveness in the international con-
text by supporting fundamental research. At the same time, knowledge application is
controlled by a variety of forms of state regulation, with a view to avoiding undesired
social and ecological consequences of technological progress - or at least of limiting
possible damage (Braun 1984:123). According to Littmann, it might certainly be much
easier to correct any undesired aspects of technological progress on the user level ra-
ther than trying to establish an optimally-structured development path for the economy as
a whole via the distribution of research funds (Littmann 1975:59). In this connection,
Collingridge has drawn attention to the central dilemma of control (1980). This is due to
the fact that, during the early stages of development, technological innovation may not
be controlled because of insufficient predictability; while later, as social and ecological
consequences may appear, it is possible to do so. Control at this stage, however, be-
comes increasingly difficult, since any changes are extremely costly due to the amount
of technological, financial, institutional and cultural investments already made.
State regulation may take the form of either laying down concrete legal provi-
sions or of influencing price setting: for instance, via the levy of taxes or other charges.
This is also described by the concepts of normative or economic regulation. Public regu-
lation is discussed above all as a means of achieving ecological objectives..
A great deal of controversy surrounds the issue of which form of regulation is
more efficient for implementing non-economic goals in economic life. By means of eco-
nomic instruments such as taxes and other charges, producers and consumers are sup-
posed to bear those external costs which they themselves have caused and which so far
have been paid for by the community (see Simonis, this volume). “Shadow prices” for
causing damage to the environment,  i t  is  assumed, wi l l  make the rat ional ly-act ing
subjects of economic life use clean technologies and environmentally-benign products
so as to avoid the costs arising from legal requirements and price hikes. Logically speak-
ing, state intervention in the price setting mechanism, will lead to the elimination from the
market of unclean technologies, to be replaced by environmentally-benign product and
process technologies.
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As criticised by Abdelmaki and Kirat, this argumentation has some weaknesses
(this volume). One major difficulty in fixing “shadow prices” lies with determining the ori-
gins of a specific environmental damage - and accordingly, discriminating against the
technologies causing the damage. In most cases, it is argued, damage is of complex ori-
gins and appears only after some time. Moreover, levies and charges by no means inva-
riably lead to the substitution of production technologies and of products depriving the
state and the environment of their clean counterparts. This is primarily a question of how
high such “shadow prices” are. The problem is that fixing exact price levels is not possi-
ble due to insufficient information on damage caused by a specific technology. They tend
to be the result of biased negotiations in which typically rather moderate prices are fixed,
mostly providing little incentive for a change in technological practices or buying habits.
In addition, the case of future generations is not taken into consideration in this proce-
dure. Of special importance, though, seems to be the argument that trying to fix a price
for environmental damage in principle suggests that nature-destructive processes are
reversible. However, in most instances, this is not the case. Therefore, ecologically-
oriented government regulation by way of price is in principle not suitable for solving the
problem of preventing environmental damage (Siderbaum 1990:3).
Legal regulation also has a number of disadvantages. It has proved to inhibit
innovation insofar as there is no special incentive for producers to improve the “‘state-of-
the-art” beyond maximum permissible emission levels. The latter are generally fixed by
the state aiming at the development of cleaner technologies. Those emissions remaining
below the standard fixed by the stete, thus do not incur any costs (Ewers 1990:156).
Moreover, the problem with setting emission standards is that this must be done at a point
in time when the extent of the individual technologies’ harmful effects is still largely un-
known (see Simonis, this volume). It comes as no surprise that emission standards tend
to be too low: as a rule, the expected damage is underrated (Nowotny and Eisikovic
1991). In addition, proof needs to be supplied that the foreseen legal regulations actually
lead to the desired ecological effects.
Various authors therefore display a generalized doubt regarding the possibility
of efficient state control of knowledge application at the enterprise level, be it via price or
legal regulations (Mayntz and Scharpf 1990:65f.). This scepticism may be substantiated
by a number of arguments, For instance, it cannot be excluded that - even by far-rea-
ching state control of knowledge application - it is still impossible to prevent the uninten-
ded negative side effects of a basically desirable innovation. After all, technological con-
texts have become increasingly complex and unpredictable. This is also true, for exam-
ple, with the catalyser, whose use is certainly less harmful to the environment but which
poses substantial, formerly neglected problems of ultimate disposal.
In addition, the thesis of controllability of knowledge application is not very plau-
sible because of the fact that new scientific findings by their very nature constitute a
public good applicable on a world-wide basis. State regulations, though, do not extend
beyond nat ional  borders -  thus being incapable of  prevent ing certain technological
developments as such.
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Not even within national borders is it possible to invariably prevent any damage
attributable to technological development by state control of knowledge application. As
can be seen from the example of nuclear energy, such a policy is powerless as soon as
the damage is due to causes lying beyond national borders. This is true in the same way
for all those types of emission which cross national borders via air or water pollution. In
this case, a technology policy based on regulation can be successful only if supranatio-
nal bodies check the compliance with technological standards and are also empowered
to impose sanctions.
Finally, there are those technologies which are unwanted from the supranational
point of view but which are of enormous advantage to individual states. This is especially
true for the military sector, In these fields, national technology policy oriented towards
controlling knowledge application, cannot achieve any satisfactory results. Even if there
is a ban on the military use of nuclear technology in individual countries, this cannot ham-
per the further development of nuclear weapons.
A series of quite similar problems would pose themselves to a state technology
pol icy at tempt ing to achieve social  object ives by means of  control l ing knowledge
application at the enterprise level. Shadow prices for the use of labour in ways detrimen-
tal to health, for instance - independently of the difficulty of setting them - would be pro-
blematic primarily because of the assumption of health as a renewable good. Legal regu-
lation, on the other hand, is confronted with the problem of proving the causality betwe-
en damage and specific technologies - an obstacle hardly to be overcome. Chronic
diseases are primarily the consequence of complex cause-and-effect relationships in
which the coping potential of the person concerned plays a substantial role: in addition,
they appear in many cases only towards the end of a person’s working life. Even greater
difficulties arise if indicators other than health hazards are taken as a yardstick for
assessing the criterion of social compatibility: for example, that of self-realisation.
Apart from the various forms of regulation, public contract-placing is considered
an especially suitable tool for implementing social and ecological aspects by means of
public R & T policy (see Edquist, this volume). By virtue of the mere choice from among
several technologies available on the market, the state might conceiveably influence
techno log i ca l  deve lopmen t ,  p rov ided  tha t  t he  l eve l  o f  s ta te  demand  i s  o f  any
significance. For instance, vehicles for state institutions might be purchased from the
point of view of specifically ecological considerations. Also, private enterprises whose
production organisation is considered as exemplary with regard to social criteria, might
be given preference when placing public contracts. Admittedly, however, this is only an
Indirect way of steering technological progress.
Of much greater significance is the placing of public contracts with the object of
providing specific research and development results. There are special advantages to
this way of exerting public influence: the expected research and development results
may be specified in detail; the instrument of contract-placing may be used in a highly fle-
xible way; and the state, through compiling the contracts, has the possibility of securing
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itself rather far-reaching rights to controlling the innovation process (Littmann 1975210).
However, if this instrument is to be used successfully, there must be a guarantee of inte-
rest on the part of private enterprises to take on contracts from the state. What is decisive
here, is whether the state monopolises patent rights to research and development results
or whether those are also at the disposal of the contracting enterprise.
The chances for putting greater emphasis on social and ecological aspects by
means of placing research and development contracts are relatively good within public
R & T policy. There are, however, some problems with using this instrument which must
not be overlooked. Let us mention here only the difficulty of a technically-adequate spe-
cification of research and development contracts by public institutions. As a rule, it can-
not be taken for granted that there is sufficient qualified staff with the specific knowledge
required for carrying out this task satisfactorily.
Therefore, in specifying contracts and defining the criteria of ecological and
social objectives, the state usually has to rely on external know-how. This, however,
involves the risk of expertise being provided from the point of view of a later participation
in a call for tenders. In order to minimise such a conflict of interests, it seems reasonable
to split the process of placing public contracts into several steps. Still, the problem
remains that this instrument might be of quite limited efficiency for orienting technological
innovation towards ecological and social objectives, due to the insufficient technical qua-
lification of state actors.
6. R & T POLICY AS A SOCIAL EXPERIMENT
In view of the problems pointed out so far, it seems necessary for public R & T
policy to adopt new approaches. Undoubtedly of but limited success would be a tech-
nocratic policy trying to achieve ecological and social aims by means of interfering in the
market mechanism or the improvement of regulatory practices. Such a re-orientation can
only be initiated by a change in political decision-making culture and by the development
of new political decision-making structures and institutions.
Regarding the change in political decision-making culture primarily with a view
to taking into account ecological objectives, a number of demands have been express-
ed: (Ewers 1990:156f.; Simonis, this volume);
- the obligation of the emitter to prove as non-harmful the effect of emissions;
- the acceptance of heuristic methods of decision-making, since cause-and-effect
relationships are insufficiently known;
- the individual obligation to automatically reduce permissible standards; and
- giving priority to less optimistic prognoses.
Quite similar demands can be made on state policy to take into consideration
social objectives of technology development. To give only one example, enterprises
should be obliged to prove that specific technological practices are not detrimental to
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health. In addition, abandoning the proof of causality of work-related illness, may be con-
ceived as a basis for political decisions. There is some doubt, however, as to the feasi-
bility of actually implementing such changes in political decision-making culture. This
explains an approach which, unlike the call for a change in public decision-making cul-
ture, does not aim at an automatic expansion of state control or regulation over the dyna-
mics of technological development. Rather it chooses to aim at a redefinition of the con-
ditions for legitimatising regulatory policies (Nowotny and Eisikovic 1991).
It would certainly be asking too much to assign to the state the role of central
societal control - including the definition of basic technological development lines, the
establ ishment and administrat ion of  comprehensive research and development pro-
grammes, and the control of knowledge application at the level of society. One factor
would be the immense coordination problems involved in such a process, In addition, as
previously mentioned, it is these very technical qualification barriers that presently speak
against such state dominance in the technological innovation process. Thus, a re-orienta-
tion of public R & T policy, must in the first place be accompanied by a redefinition of the
state’s role in the technological innovation process. This should primarily be based on
coordination, integration and information. There is more or less unanimous agreement in
professional literature that public R & T policy can by no means remain restricted to either
supporting technological knowledge or to controlling its application. It seems to be the
state’s central task to create a consensus on socially-desired and undesired lines of tech-
nological development - not least because of the far-reaching social consequences pri-
marily due to the systemic character of new technologies (BrÑunling 1986). At the same
time, this means that new decision-making structures should not only aim at integrating
external expertise but also at more incorporating democratic elements.
The establishment of technology assessment centres is generally considered an
essential institutional innovation aiming at simultaneously pursuing economic, ecological
and social ends within the scope of public R & T policy. However, the days seem to be
over when one witnessed the heyday of  a type of  technology assessment or iented
towards risk assessment in mere terms of quantity. There are several reasons for this
Firstly, risk assessment by various experts - especially in the early stages of the process
of technological innovation - have proved to be widely diverging. This makes it clear that
risk assessment is highly dependent on the subjective interpretations and interests of
experts. In addition, risks of a social or ecological type are often connected with specific
technological practices rather than with a specific substantive technology. Here, how-
ever, a purely technocratic risk assessment is impossible. Finally, the traditional form of
technology assessment - as a rule characterised by centralisation, bureaucratisation and
expert-orientation - lacks the democratic element. This is due to the serious social impact
of new technology systems, one decisive for an R & T policy based on consensus.
The impossibility of objectivising technological risks involves the danger of
specific interests being imposed, even if unintentionally, by way of technology policy.
There are var ious decis ion-making approaches designed to avoid th is problem.
Especially in the US, public R & T policy is based on the instrument of concurrent exper-
tise. One has to admit, though, that those views perceived as too critical are often exclu-
ded from the opinion-forming process: either they lack the convincing lobby or the neces-
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sary resources for scientifically sustaining their ideas. To compensate for this, public R &
T policy would have to be committed to increased support for “alternative research insti-
tutes”.
The problem of orienting the technological innovation process towards social
and environmental concerns, may not be solved by means of expert advice: This type of
technology assessment continues to be based on the idea of direct regulatory-interven-
tionist control by the state. However, this means that there is no direct link between tech-
nology assessment and the development of new - or the improvement of existing - tech-
nologies There is no direct input of knowledge on social and ecological risks into the
technological innovation process; only an indirect one exists, via government measures.
Moreover, technological practices largely defy the logics of state interventionism. These
include, apart form technical, also organisational and cultural aspects. Thus, public R &
T policy must watch out for alternatives to the classical centralist technology assessment
model based on expert knowledge.
Such new forms of technology assessment have already started to appear on the
horizon. At the enterprise level, those directly concerned are increasingly assigned an
expert role in the techno-organisational restructuring of production and work processes.
Their experience with regard to social and ecological impacts of technology, is thus
immediately integrated into the technological  innovat ion process (Naschold 1986;
Badham and Naschold, this volume). At the level of society, the institutionalisation of a
democratic dialogue between various social groups and institutions constitutes a form of
technology assessment (Nowotny and Eis ikovic 1991).  The idea of  “Construct ive
Technology Assessment”, as spread by NOTA in the Netherlands, is another indication of
change in the forms of technology assessment (see Boxsel, this volume).
Characteristic of this change is the transition from public regulation to the self-
regulation of technological innovations (Latnik and Simonis, this volume). The state - or
rather, the institutions established by the state - confine themselves primarily to the role
of providing the necessary conditions for experiments of a socially- and environmentally-
oriented technology development and application. Thus, for instance, it may be regarded
as the central element of constructive technology assessment, to provide for the network-
ing of researchers, innovators and other social groups according to the idea of a socio-
technical - as well as to strengthen the mechanisms of communication and cooperation.
Organising such a dialogue pursues the aim of integrating a maximum of social pers-
pect ives and interests into the innovat ion process at  a stage as ear ly as possible
Accompanying investigations on socially- and ecologically-oriented technological inno-
vations, shall certainly provide additional input into the social dialogue. In this way, this is
at least the intention that a continuous learning process will be sat into motion. Moreover,
by means of the widest possible diffusion of the knowledge thus gained, there will be a
heightening in social awareness of the social and ecological problems of technological
progress.
Quite similar aims to the concept of constructive technological assessment are
pursued by the SoTech programme of North Rhine-Westphalia (Latnik and Simonis, this
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volume) as well as by the Integrated Environment programme developed by EPA in the
USA (Daneke, this volume). As far as the scope of expansion of such R & T policy is con-
cerned, there is due cause for scepticism. Many state-supported social and ecological
experiments are far from having model character, and there is hardly ever a diffusion
throughout society at large. Nevertheless, such experiments seem to contribute to a cul-
tural change, in increasing people’s awareness of the social and ecological aspects of
technology development and utilisation.
7. CONCLUSION
Since its onset, public R & T policy has undergone considerable change. The
new understanding of technology may serve as initial evidence of this. While state inter-
vention was originally aimed at material aspects only, now organisational and cultural
aspects are increasingly taken into consideration. The object is no longer pure substan-
t ive technology but rather technological  pract ices, Moreover,  to an ever- increasing
extent, social and ecological aspects are integrated into the objectives of public R & T
policy, despite its original exclusive orientation towards economic growth. Rather than
being predominantly oriented towards fundamental research, the scope of state inter-
ventionism increasingly includes those stages of the technological innovation process
that are more closely linked to the market. While public R &. T policy was originally part of
economic policy, it is gradually developing into an independent policy field closely inter-
linked with such fields as educational, financial, industrial and labour market policy - to
name just a few. Formerly implicit technology policy is thus more and more developing
into explicit technology policy, which means that technological aspects are also consi-
dered in the form of state influence on these policy fields. Finally, the role of the state in
the technological innovation process is also undergoing change. While the state originally
understood itself to be the central actor trying to impose specific technological develop-
ment lines by means of support and regulation, it has recently rather turned into a facili-
tator and coordinator providing institutional arrangements for the self-regulation of tech-
nological innovation. This can also be called a transition from direct to context control. In
the following overview, some significant characteristics of traditional and modern tech-
nology policy shall once again be compared.
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Table 1: Characteristics of traditional and modern technology policy
Object
Traditional R & T policy
Material aspects
(substantive technology)
Modern R & T policy
In addition, organisational
institutional and
cultural aspects
(technological practices)
Objective Economic growth In addition, social and
ecological compatibility
Stage of technological
innovation process
Policy integration
Stages of little bearing
on the market (primarily
fundamental research)
Part of economic policy
(largely implicit R & T
policy)
Also stages closer to
the market
(technology transfer)
Independent policy-field
closely interlinked with
other policy areas
(increasingly explicit
technology policy)
Role of the state Central actor of technological -
innovation process
Facilitator and co-
ordinator of the self-regulation
of the innovation process
Instrument Support, regulation Provision of infrastructure
Policy type Direct control Context control
It goes without saying that this is a presentation of ideal types. In reality, R & T
policy in the individual countries is a combination of traditional and modern elements.
However, one may clearly observe that such aspects as context control, explicit policy,
the combination with other policy fields, integration of social and ecological objectives,
greater closeness to the market, and technological practices are all indeed increasingly
becoming constituent elements of the R & T policies of individual countries. Nevertheless,
the development of a new type of public intervention in the technological innovation pro-
cess cannot yet be concluded.
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